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Abstract
Following on from Quint and Rabanal (2014), who nd that coordination between
the monetary authority and macroprudential regulators generates virtually identical
results to non-coordination, we extend their model in a variety of ways. We address
the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates, feedback of the macroprudential tool
on the output growth rate, and the role of reserves. In all cases, we nd that there is
signicant impact on the coecients of the simple rule and on consumption-equivalent
welfare eects.
This work is supported by the EU 7th framework collaborative project Integrated
Macro-Financial Modelling for Robust Policy Design (MACFINROBODS)), Grant no.
612796.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to re-evaluate a recent paper by Quint and Rabanal (2014),
which examined the optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential policies in an estimated
model of the euro area. There are three additional issues that can most obviously be ad-
dressed within the context of their DSGE model. Firstly, although their optimal policies,
as evaluated via optimal simple rules, relative to the estimated simple rules show con-
sumption equivalent welfare benets or losses of the order of 0.6-0.7%, these are evaluated
without consideration as to how frequently the zero lower bound (ZLB) for the nominal
interest rate is violated. Here we correct for this by penalising deviations from the steady
state of the nominal interest rate such that the likelihood of violating the ZLB occurs once
every 400 quarters. Secondly, we evaluate whether there is any benet from using optimal
simple rules that include deviations of output from steady state - commonly viewed as
countercyclical policy as advocated by by Goodhart; this can be viewed as a feedback that
is additional to the standard feedback on either credit growth or on credit/GDP ratios.
Finally we also examine the impact of reserve ratios for the nancial intermediaries in the
model. Quint and Rabanal (2014) assume that the lending-to-deposit ratio is 1 in steady
state; although the model is not ideal for examining changes in this ratio, by allowing for
the possibility that borrowers in the model have a discount factor that is lower than that
assumed by Quint and Rabanal (2014) we are able to evaluate the costs and benets of
banks having a certain required reserve ratio.
The main reasons for focusing so closely on the paper by Quint and Rabanal (2014)
is precisely for the reasons documented by Loisel (2014) in his comments on their work,
namely that it incorporates European monetary union, it is (mainly) an estimated model,
it incorporates a nancial accelerator rather than collateral constraints as its nancial
friction, and that optimal simple rules are designed via maximization of the same wel-
fare function as the one on which the model is based. The main change that we make
from their analysis is that we begin with a nonlinear version of their model, and choose
optimal policies on the basis of a linear quadratic approximation about the deterministic
optimum. These policies are then evaluated through the welfare eects on a second-order
approximation to the nonlinear model.
Section 2 provides a brief description of the model, and focuses on how the model with
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given parameters is not terribly suitable to analyse the eect of reserve ratios, although it
is suitable for evaluating loan-to-deposit ratios greater than 1. This latter was suggested
by Loisel (2014) as a policy that eectively subsidizes lending by nancial intermediaries;
however this issue is not tackled in this paper. Section 3 points out the ZLB violations that
need to be tackled when designing optimal rules, and also evaluates the gains and losses
from including an output term rather than just a credit term in the macroprudential
rule. Section 4 then addresses how the model can be used in the case when there are
capital constraints and the loan-to-deposit ratio is less than 1. Because of the nature of
the model, the interest rate paid by borrowers will be larger than than the discount rate
in their utility function, so there is clearly a limit to how large this can be in order to
remotely match the data, and this therefore places a constraint on the loan-to-deposit
ratio, as we shall see below. Nevertheless a reasonable change in this discount rate is
sucient to generate consumption-equivalent welfare losses that are of the order of those
generated by the optimal policies evaluated by Quint and Rabanal (2014).
2 Description of the Model and Steady State Financial Fric-
tion Eects
There are two blocs in the economy; we shall only summarise the model for the the 'home'
bloc H, and not for the 'foreign' bloc F.
2.1 Households
Households in H are either patient and impatient, with discount factors of  and b respec-
tively, where  > b. The patient households are savers, while the impatient households
are borrowers. Their respective proportions in the population are  and 1   . Saver j
maximizes the expected utility function with external habit:
E0
1X
t=0
"
Ct log(C
j
t   Ct 1) + (1  )Dt log(Djt ) 
(Ljt )
1+'
1 + '
#
(1)
where Cjt is the consumption of non-durable goods, D
j
t the consumption of the stock
of housing goods and Ljt is labour, and 
C
t ; 
D
t are preference shocks. Borrowers have
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an analogous utility function, with utility dependent on CB;jt ; D
B;j
t ; L
B;j
t , and with habit
parameter B.
Non-durable consumption for savers is an index of home CjH;t and foreign goods C
j
F;t
which satisfy
(Cjt )
1  1
C =
1
 C
(CjH;t)
1  1
C +
1
(1  )C (C
j
F;t)
1  1
C (2)
where  is a measure of home bias. This leads to an overall price index for non-durables
PCt given by
(PCt )
1 C = (PHt )
1 C + (1  )(PFt )1 C (3)
where PHt ; P
F
t are the price indices of home and foreign produced non-durables, assuming
that consumers maximize subject to their budget constraints.
At the household level there is imperfect substitutability between labour supply LC;jt ,
LD;jt to the non-durable and non-durable sectors respectively which is represented by the
preferences
(Ljt )
1+L =  L(LC;jt )
1+L + (1  ) L(LD;jt )1+L (4)
For borrowers there are analogous representations of labour supply and non-durable con-
sumption that incorporate the letter B.
The budget constraint of savers in real terms, relative to the price of non-durable goods
PCt , is given by
Cjt +QtI
j
t + S
j
t =
Rt 1
Ct
Sjt 1 +W
C
t L
C;j
t +W
D
t L
D;j
t +
j
t (5)
where Qt = P
C
t =P
D
t is the relative price of durable to non-durable goods, I
j
t is residential
investment, Sjt is real savings, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, 
C
t is the ination rate
of non-durable goods, WCt ;W
D
t are real wages in each sector and 
j
t is prots. The latter
is from intermediate goods producers in both sectors, from domestic and international
banks and from the debt collection agencies who intervene for the banks to collect debt
from defaulting borrowers.
The budget constraint for borrowers will be described after discussion of the role of
the banking sector in the model.
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Residential investment Ijt by savers is used to increase the housing stock:
Djt = (1  )Djt 1 + (1  F
 
Ijt 1
Ijt 1
!
)Ijt 1 (6)
where  is the depreciation rate and F is an adjustment cost given by F (x) =  2 (x  1)2.
2.2 Firms
Homogeneous nal durable and non-durable goods are produced using a continuum of
intermediate goods, indexed by h 2 [0; n], (n < 1), in the home bloc, and h 2 (n; 1] in
the foreign bloc. These intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes and are not traded
across blocs.
2.2.1 Final Goods Producers
Final non-durable goods are traded across blocs, but durables are not, and are only used
to increase the housing stock. Final goods sectors are perfectly competitive with exible
prices.
Final goods aggregate the intermediate goods according to
(Y kt )
1  1
 = n
 1

Z n
0
Y kt (h)
1  1
 dh; k = fC;Dg (7)
where  is the price elasticity. Prot maximization leads to
Y Ct (h) =

PHt (h)
PHt
 
Y Ct Y
D
t (h) =

PDt (h)
PDt
 
Y Dt (8)
where the price indices for home-produced non-durables and durables are given by
(P kt )
1  =
1
n
Z n
0
P kt (h)
1 dh k = fH;Dg (9)
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate goods are produced monopolistic competition using labour only:
Y Ct (h) = AtZ
C
t L
C
t (h) Y
D
t (h) = AtZ
D
t L
D
t (h) (10)
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where the shock At is common to both sectors, but there are also sector-specic shocks
ZCt and Z
D
t . With all these shocks assumed to have an average value of 1, this means that
the real wages WCt ;W
D
t in equilibrium are the same in each sector.
Real marginal cost in each sector is then given by
MCCt =
WCt
AtZCt
PCt
PHt
MCDt =
WDt
QtAtZDt
(11)
The producers then solve a standard Calvo prot-maximization problem with price index-
ation that yields the following:
JCt   CEt
240@H;t+1

C
H;t
1A JCt+1
35 = MCCt Y Ct
Ct   Ct 1 (12)
HCt   CEt
240@H;t+1

C
H;t
1A 1HCt+1
35 = 1  1


Y Ct
Ct   Ct 1 (13)
1 = (1  C)(JCt =HCt )1  + C(H;t=
C
H;t 1)
 1 (14)
There are a similar set of equations for durable goods with parameters D; D.
2.3 Market Clearing
In the non-durable sector, total supply of goods is equal to the total demand by borrowers
and savers in each bloc, taking into account the share of population (n; 1 n) in each bloc
and the proportions of savers and borrowers in each bloc (; 1  ; ; 1  ). Thus
nY Ct = n(CH;t + (1  )CBH;t) + (1  n)(CH;t + (1  )CBH;t) (15)
For residential investment we have
nY Dt = n(It + (1  )IBt ) (16)
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The evolution of the home bloc's net foreign assets expressed in real terms relative to its
non-durable price index is given by
nBt = n
Rt 1
Ct
Bt+(1 n)PH;t
PCt
(CH;t+(1 )CBH;t) n
PF;t
PCt
(CF;t+(1 )CBF;t) (17)
The model is closed by assuming the following relationship between home and foreign
interest rates, that allows for a risk premium from net foreign assets:
log(Rt =Rt) = t + 
bBt=Y
C
t (18)
where t is a mean-zero shock. Home GDP is given by Yt = Y
C
t +QtY
D
t , with euro-area
GDP and CPI given by
Y EMUt = (Yt)
n(Y t )
1 n PEMUt = (P
C
t )
n(PCt )
1 n (19)
In addition the interest rate for the home bloc is assumed to be set by the ECB, and is a
Taylor rule dependent on euro-area ination and euro-area output.
2.4 Financial Intermediaries
The model for credit markets of Quint and Rabanal (2014) is virtually identical to that of
Zhang (2009), Suh (2012) and Darracq-Paries et al (2011). It allows for default risk in the
mortgage market, with borrowers defaulting if the value of their debt is higher than the
value of their house. Such default leads of course to an interest spread between borrowers
and depositors. The setup is very similar to that of Bernanke et al (1999), but without
the agency and asymmetric information aspects.
Financial intermediaries pay depositors a gross interest rate Rt, and extend loans to
borrowers at a gross rate RLt . Credit is granted backed by the value of the housing stock,
and each borrower is subject to an idiosyncratic quality shock to the value of the house
!jt . This latter is log-normally distributed, with mean equal to 1, which means that the
shock is distributed as log(!jt )  N( 122!;t; 2!;t). This allows for 2!;t to vary over time,
with log(!;t=!) following an AR(1) process.
Borrowers with high !jt can repay their loans, but values that are 'too' low cause
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loans to default. If default occurs, banks call in debt-collection agencies which return a
proportion (1 ) of the realized value of borrower j's housing stock. The agencies retain
a proportion  which is redistributed as prots to the patient consumers.
The ex ante threshold value !at (to be determined within the context of the model) of
default will correspond to that value of !jt where the expected value of the housing stock
exactly matches the gross interest payment on the loan. Recalling that DBt is the real
value of the housing stock, writing SBt as the real value of the loan relative to non-durable
good price PCt , it follows that
!atEt[Qt+1
C
t+1D
B
t+1] = R
L
t S
B
t (20)
For borrowers, the ex post threshold value !pt 1 for which a borrower can just repay the
loan is
!pt 1QtD
B
t 
C
t = R
L
t 1S
B
t 1 (21)
This means that the budget constraint for borrowers (who receive no income from prots)
is dierent for those hit by a shock above this threshold value, who pay a gross real return
to the banks of RLt 1SBt 1=Ct , and those hit by a shock below this threshold, who pay
!jt 1QtD
B
t 1. Summing the probability distribution across all these borrowers leads to an
aggregate budget identity:
CBt +Qt

IBt +

log!pt 1
!;t 1
  !;t 1
2

DBt

+
 log!pt 1
!;t 1
  !;t 1
2

RLt 1S
B
t 1
= SBt +W
C
t L
C;B
t +W
D
t L
D;B
t (22)
As Quint and Rabanal (2014) point out, the relevant average interest paid out on the
loan SBt 1 should then be expressed as RDt + 
 log!pt 1
!;t 1  
!;t 1
2

RLt 1 where RDt =
Qt

log!pt 1
!;t 1  
!;t 1
2

DBt =S
B
t 1.
The balance sheet of nancial intermediaries involves savings St by patient consumers,
which represents liabilities, net claims on nancial intermediaries in the foreign country Bt,
loans to impatient consumers SBt ; in addition there may be reserves and equity. However,
we ignore equity, although we shall briey discuss this below.
Assuming banks are risk-neutral, they require the expected return from credit to be
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equal to the deposit rate. The expected return depends on the return from the non-
defaulters which is xed at RLt and on the expected return from the defaulters which
depends on the distribution of !jt below the threshold value !
a
t . Thus, taking into ac-
count the properties of the log normal distribution, one can show that this participation
constraint is given by
nRt(St Bt) = n(1 )Et[(1 )( log!
a
t
!;t
 !;t
2
)Qt+1
C
t+1D
B
t+1+( 
log!at
!;t
 !;t
2
)RLt S
B
t ]
(23)
where () is the cumulative normal distribution.
The macroprudential instrument t aects the fraction of liabilities that the bank can
lend:
n
1
t
(St  Bt) = n(1  )SBt (24)
2.5 The Steady State
In Appendix A, we outline a minor dierence between the calculation of the steady state
compared with Quint and Rabanal (2014). In their paper they set the preference parameter
 in the utility function such that the fraction of non-durable to total production is equal
to , one of the preference parameters used for aggregating labour. This is associated
with a relative price Qt = 1 of investment to consumption goods. Because we address the
possibility that the steady state value of the macroprudential instrument t might not be
set to 1, Qt = 1 will not necessarily hold in steady state.
2.5.1 Steady State Financial Friction Eects
Given the discount factors ; b for savers and borrowers, in steady state each of these
will be equated to the inverse of the interest rates faced these two groups of consumers
via the steady state of the relevant Euler equations.
In equilibrium, by setting (1   )(1   n) = (1   )n, the steady state of net foreign
assets Bt is 0, so that per capita output and consumption is the same in each bloc. It
is then straightforward to obtain the steady state of the the threshold value ! as being
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satised by
b
   1 + 
!


log!
!
  !
2

= (1  
b

)

  log!
!
  !
2

(25)
As is well known for nancial accelerator models of this sort, a value of  > 0 is a necessary
condition for a solution to the threshold value; otherwise one side of this equation will be
positive, and the other negative. As regards the impact of the macroprudential variable,
Quint and Rabanal assume throughout that the steady state value of  is 1, implying that
on average the loan to deposit ratio is equal to 1. However there is of course no reason
for this to be the case. Consider initially the simplest bank balance sheet representation:
deposits + equity = loans + reserves, where the LHS represents liabilities and the RHS
represents assets. In the absence of equity, loans will be less than or equal to reserves,
which corresponds to the case   1. Loisel (2014) suggests that it is feasible for   1,
implying a subsidy for banks, presumably by government taking an equity stake in banks
but requiring either no return or a return less than that provided to depositors. Whereas
this may be feasible in the short term, it seems unlikely as a long term solution.
A quick glance at (25) indicates that reasonable assumptions about  and b will be
inconsistent with typical capital or reserve requirements for nancial intermediaries of the
order of 8%. The model requires (1  b ) to be positive, so that the assumptions of Quint
and Rabanal (2014) of  = 0:99 and b = 0:985 will only permit values of  < 1:005.
Below however, we shall investigate values of  = 0:99 and b = 0:96 for which  = 1:02
provides a reasonable comparison with  = 1. Since b = 0:96 implies that the lending
rate is over 4% per quarter, this value is at the outer limits of borrowing rates, given that
credit card borrowing rates are of the order of 18% per annum.
3 Impact of the Zero Lower Bound for Interest Rates
Quint and Rabanal (2014) estimate some of the parameters of the model above, and also
include estimates of a Taylor Rule
log(Rt= R) = rlog(Rt 1= R)+(1 r)[log(EMUt =EMU )+ylog(Y EMUt =Y EMUt 1 )] (26)
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as well as macroprudential rules for each bloc:
log(t=) = ;sblog(t) log(

t =) = 

;sblog(

t ) (27)
where t is either the ratio of credit to GDP (relative to its steady state value) or else
the growth of credit. The authors evaluate the welfare gains from optimized values of
these parameters, and nd that for credit/GDP there are benets to savers and losses for
borrowers in the two blocs, with an average benet of 0.12% in consumption equivalent
terms for feedback on credit growth all consumers benet, with an average benet of 0.06%
consumption equivalent.
However in both of these cases the standard error of the nominal interest rate, which
is not reported in the paper, is around 6% for each quarter. Since the steady state value
of the nominal interest rate is 1.01% per quarter, this implies continual violations of the
zero lower bound on interest rates.
Levine et al (2008) have shown how to get round the zero lower bound problem without
requiring occasionally binding constraint software. The simplest solution is to add a
penalty  wr((Rt  R)2+(Rt   R)2) to the utility function, and to increase the value of wr
until the standard errors of the interest rates are suciently small. Here we have selected
standard errors of 0.36% which implies a violation of the ZLB once every 400 quarters on
average, assuming that interest rates are approximately normally distributed.
In Table 1 we give the values of the optimizing coecients in two cases; in each case we
allow for smoothing (with coecients ; 

) of the instruments t; 

t via feedback on their
lagged values, and feedback on credit growth. We also allow in the second case for the
instruments to feed back on output growth (with coecients ;y; 

;y); this has come to be
associated with Goodhart's recommendations that macroprudential rules should respond
to the business cycle, and we compare the consumption equivalent benets across these
two regimes.
The foreign () bloc represents the periphery countries Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain, so it is not so surprising that policy for that bloc should be somewhat more
active. However the expected loss to lenders compared with the gain for borrowers is likely
to ensure that the response to output growth is so large as not to be pursued.
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Rule r; ; y ; ;sb; ;y 

 ; 

;sb; 

;y W
S WB WS WB
Simple 0.9,1.014,0.097 0.99, 0.43, 0 0.99,0.43,0 - - - -
Simple with Y 0.9,1.014,0.097 0.99, 0.446,0 0.99,1,0.203 -0.02% 0.04% -0.68% 1.06%
Table 1: Optimized Simple Rules, with and without response to output growth.
Final columns compare the benets for savers S and borrowers B in each bloc.
4 The Impact of Reserve Requirements
As observed earlier, the model that we are handling is too basic to allow for reserve
requirements (or provisioning or capital ratios) as high as 8%. In order to get a handle on
the importance of this, even at levels as low as 2%, we modify the model with regard to
two parameters only, namely the steady state level !, which characterizes the distribution
of the idiosyncratic quality shock to housing, and the discount rate of borrowers b.
As regards the two discount factors, whereas Quint and Rabanal assume discount
factors of 0.99 and 0.985, Angelini and Gerali (2012) assume 0.996 and 0.975, Beau et al
(2012) assume 0.994 and 0.975, and Iacoviello (2013) assumes 0.9925 and 0.94. For this
section we assume 0.99 and 0.96, and change the value of ! from 0.1742 to 0.05. This
enables us to use a steady state value of  = 1:02 to compare with  = 1.
The main deterministic characteristics of this comparison are the values of the long
term interest rates, the threshold value !, the total credit SB, and how these aect the
consumption equivalent gains or losses of patient and impatient consumers. In Table 2,
we show how these vary. Firstly, we see that with the proportion of loans coming down
as  increases, the total credit decreases, which lowers the risk of default, so that the
interest rate spread decreases; as a consequence the threshold value for non-performing
loans comes down as well. The lowered interest rates paid by borrowers therefore increase
their utility. However total savings by patient consumers are lower, which can be seen by
comparing savings per borrower when  = 1, equal to 3:4751  compared with  = 1:02
when they are 3:389  1:021  = 3:4571  . This lowers consumption, so that savers are
worse o.
We also examine the eects of optimal simple rules in each of these cases, and these
appear in Table 3. As can be seen from this table, the main eect is to welfare in the
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 RL ! SB WS and WS WB and WB
1 1.046 0.949 3.475 - -
1.02 1.043 0.922 3.389 -0.25% 0.42%
Table 2: Eect of Loan to Deposit Ratio Less than 1. Final columns compare the
benets for savers S and borrowers B.
 r; ; y ; ;sb 

 ; 

;sb W
S WB WS WB
1 0.9,1.014,0.097 0.99, 0.55 0.99,0.99 - - - -
1.02 0.9,1.014,0.097 0.99, 1 0.99,0.99 -0.27% 0.47% 0% 0%
Table 3: Optimized Simple Rules, without response to output growth. Final
columns compare the benets for savers S and borrowers B in each bloc.
home bloc.
5 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper has been to assess the importance of additional cyclical
features in the macroprudential rule, and to assess the eect of reserve requirements and/or
provisioning and/or capital requirements, with the latter being indistinguishable within
the model of the paper. In addition we have investigated rules that satisfy the ZLB
constraint for nominal interest rates at virtually every period.
The results have shown that macroprudential rules that respond to growth rates of
output have potentially signicant eects. The reason for this is that in a recession, when
credit growth has become negative, the rule will try and compensate for this; however, any
subsequent small positive growth in credit will then immediately dampen this eect, so a
further reaction to negative output growth is needed in order to stimulate the economy
further by additional credit.
We have also demonstrated that there are gains and losses to each of borrowers and
savers respectively when reserve requirements are increased, which means that it is a
political decision as to the exact level which can be regarded as optimal. However, coupled
with this, one needs to take account of nancial stability; our analysis has only examined
the ZLB for interest rates, so further account must be taken of the volatility of reserves
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as measured by the macroprudential variables t.
Finally, when one accounts for the ZLB on the interest rate, it is clear that both
interest rate rules and the macroprudential rules are very dierent from those obtained by
Quint and Rabanal (2014).
As regards further work, although the model is a general equilibrium one with sticky
prices, it needs further renement in order to introduce the levels of reserves and capital
requirements that are currently under discussion by regulators. In addition, this paper
has not studied the gains from coordination, which were not found to be of importance in
the initial working paper of Quint and Rabanal. Clearly the eects of the ZLB may play
a role here, so this needs further investigation.
References
Angelini, P and Gerali, A (2012), "Banks' reactions to Basel-III," Temi di discussione
(Economic working papers) 876, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Re-
lations Area.
Beau, D., L. Clerc, and B. Mojon (2012), Macro-Prudential Policy and the Conduct
of Monetary Policy. Bank of France Workingpaper 390.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999) The Financial Accelerator in a
Quantitative Business Cycle Framework. In Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1C, ed.
J. Taylor and M. Woodford, 134193. Elsevier.
Darracq-Paries, M, Srensen, C and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, D, (2011) "Macroeconomic
Propagation under Dierent Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE
Model for the Euro Area". International Journal of Central Banking 7(4), 49-113.
Iacoviello, M (2015), "Financial business cycles", Review of Economic Dynamics 18(1),
140163.
Levine, P, McAdam, P and Pearlman, J, (2008) "Quantifying and Sustaining Gains
from Monetary Policy Commitment", Journal of Monetary Economics 55(7), 1253-1276.
Loisel, O, (2014) "Discussion of 'Monetary and Macroprudential and Macroprudential
Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model of the Euro Area' ", International Journal of Central
Banking 10(2), 237-247.
Quint, D and Rabanal, P (2014) "Monetary and Macroprudential Policy in an Esti-
13
mated DSGE Model of the Euro Area", International Journal of Central Banking 10(2),
169-236.
Suh (2012) Macroprudential Policy: Its Eects and Relationship to Monetary Policy.
Working Paper No. 1228, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Zhang (2009) Bank Capital Regulation, the Lending Channel and Business Cycles. Dis-
cussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies No. 2009,33, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research
Centre.
Appendix
A Additional Steady State Equations
The equations below for Q and L are required in addition to the steady state equations
derived by Quint and Rabanal (2014) when the parameters are such that Q is not equal
to 1:


1  1



1   +
1  
1  b (L=L
B)'

+ (1  )Q1+
1
L

= L'((1  )LB + L)
(A.1)
1  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Q 1 
1
L



1  1



(1  )  +
1  
(1  b) b (L=L
B)'

= (1 )L'((1 )LB+L)
(A.2)
where
  =
(1  (1  ))
(1  )(1  )  
B =
(1  B(1  ))
B(1  )(1  B) (A.3)
Note that these two equations are not analytically equivalent to one another when Q = 1.
However Quint and Rabanal (2014) calibrate the value of  in such a way that these are
consistent with one another numerically when Q = 1.
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